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Will New York Recognize Same-Sex Marriage?: 
An Analysis of the Conflict-of-Laws' 
Public Policy Exception* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
If same-sex marriage is legally condoned by the state of Hawaii, 1 there 
will be an inevitable wave of litigation across each state of the Union. 
Whether a same-sex marriage performed in Hawaii will be recognized 
elsewhere must be decided on a state-by-state basis.2 This Comment fo-
cuses on the state of New York, where the Supreme Court of Tompkins 
County decided in 1996 in Storrs v. Holcomb that New Y ark "does not 
recognize or authorize same-sex marriage. "3 
While New York does not grant marriage licenses other than for 
opposite-sex couples, New York may soon face the question of whether it 
will recognize a same-sex marriage validly performed in another state. In 
deciding this issue, New York must rely on its conflict-of-laws methodol-
ogy which stems from the general rule that a marriage in one state will be 
recognized in another, unless it violates "strong public policy."4 The recent 
Storrs opinion sheds an introductory light on New York's public policy as 
evidenced by the court's unapproving response to the notion of same-sex 
and female, testifies to a contrary political, cultural, religious and legal 
* Copyright © 1998 by Todd C. Hilbig. 
I. See Anthony Dominic D'Amato, Note, Coriflict of Laws Rules and the Interstate 
Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 911, 912-13 (1995). For a summary of 
the Hawaii litigation, see Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), reconsideration granted in part, 
Baehr v. Lewin, 875 P.2d 225, appeal after remand, Baehr v. Miike, 910 P.2d 112 (Haw. 1996), 
on remand, Baehr v. Miike, No. CIV. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). 
2. State law governs marriage, and states may place certain limitations on the ability to 
marry. See, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 303 (1942) (noting that, within limits 
of state power, states may enforce their own marital policies). 
On September 21, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA), which grants the states the right to ignore same-sex marriages contracted in other states, 
and creates a federal definition of marriage, which excludes same-sex couples, to be applied in 
connection with all federal statutes and programs. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub.L.No. 104-199, 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 2419 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C and I U.S.C. § 7). 
3. 645 N.Y.S.2d 286, 288 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996). See infra Part II. 
4. Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 687 (N.Y. 1985). 
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consensus. "5 
Part II of this Note provides the historical background and procedural 
development of Storrs v. Holcomb, New York's latest and most significant 
case on same-sex marriage. Part Ill reviews conflict-of-laws principles 
generally and New York's analysis specifically. Part IV discusses the ex-
ception to the conflict-of-laws rule by asking whether recognition of same-
sex marriage would violate New York's 'strong public policy.' This Com-
ment derives New York's public policy from four major categories: state 
statutes, case law, constitutional analysis, and the state's concept of funda-
mental justice, good morals, and tradition.6 Part V concludes that, although 
it is possible New York will validate same-sex marriages celebrated in for-
eign states, that possibility is remote considering the background of New 
York's prevailing public policy. 
II. STORRS V. HOLCOMB: HISTORICAL AND PROCEDURAL SYNOPSIS 
Two men, Phillip and Toshav Storrs, (hereinafter petitioners) applied 
for a marriage license at the office of the City Clerk in Ithaca, New York, 
on May 18, J995.7 Ithaca city clerk Julie Holcomb (hereinafter respon-
dent), citing an existing directive from the state Department of Health 
(hereinafter DOH), informed them that she could not issue a marriage li-
cense to two persons of the same sex.8 Subsequently, respondent received 
a letter and memorandum from DOH confirming that she was not autho-
rized to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples because they cannot 
be legally married.9 
Petitioners then commenced a declaratory judgment action against re-
spondent to issue them a marriage license, alleging that the same-sex mar-
riage ban violated their constitutional rights. 10 The Supreme Court, 
Tompkins County, notified the Attorney General's office of the constitu-
tional challenge by letter; however, the Assistant Solicitor General re-
sponded that his office would not participate in the proceedings. 11 The Su-
preme Court never ordered that DOH be joined as a necessary party. 12 
Without addressing the necessary party issue, the trial court upheld respon-
dent's denial of petitioners' marriage license application on the merits, 
5. Storrs, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 287. 
6. Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 688. 
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finding that the same-sex marriage ban did not violate petitioner's consti-
tutional rights. 13 
Petitioners appealed directly to the Court of Appeals of New York 
which transferred the case to the Appellate Division, Third Department, 
upon the ground that a direct appeal does not lie when questions other than 
the constitutional validity of a statutory provision are involved. 14 On De-
cember 24, 1997, the Appellate Division dismissed the case on procedural 
grounds without addressing petitioners' contentions on the merits. 15 The 
appeals court held that the Supreme Court "should have dismissed the ac-
tion/proceeding without prejudice because petitioners failed to join DOH, 
a necessary party."16 Consequently, even if, perhaps especially if, the legis-
lature passes new laws regarding same-sex marriage, this case and this is-
sue will continue to be litigated and debated in New York for several 
years. 
ill. CHOICE OF LAW, CONFLICT-OF-LAWS, AND THE 
PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION 
Should Hawaii fully authorize same-sex marriage, conflicts between 
Hawaii's law and other states' laws would eventually arise. When con-
fronted with a conflict-of-laws issue, a court must first choose whether to 
apply its own law or the foreign state's law. Only after this initial determi-
nation is made can the court look at the appropriate substantive law. Many 
states have adopted a conflicts analysis which incorporates the REST ATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1988) (hereinafter RESTATE-
MENT), or an adaptation thereof, which allows the court to consider the 
contacts and interests of parties and states, as well as the public policy of 
the forum state. 17 
13. !d. at 836-37. 
14. Storrs v. Holcomb, 674 N.E.2d 335 (N.Y. 1996). 
15. Storrs v. Holcomb, 666 N.Y.S.2d 835, 837 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). 
16. /d. 
17. For cases applying the RESTATEMENT SECOND's rule, see Vandever v. Industrial Comm'n, 
714 P.2d 866, 869 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); Leszinske v. Poole, 798 P.2d 1049, 1053 (N.M. Ct. App. 
1990). For cases applying a similar rule in the RESTATEMENT FIRST see Loughran v. Loughran, 292 
U.S. 216, 223 (1934); State v. Graves, 307 S.W.2d 545, 547 (Ark. 1957); Henderson v. Henderson, 
87 A.2d 403, 408 (Md. 1952); Meisenhelder v. Chicago & N. W Ry., 213 N.W. 32, 33 (Minn. 
1927); Bucca v. State, 128 A.2d 506, 508 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1957); In re May's Estate, 114 
N.E.2d 4, 6 (N.Y. 1953). 
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A. RESTATEMENT Approach 
The conflict-of-laws analysis embodied in the RESTATEMENT generally 
prescribes a "most significant relationship" test to determine which state's 
law applies. Section 283, in pertinent part, states: 
(1) The validity of a marriage will be determined by the 
local law of the state which, with respect to the particular 
issue, has the most significant relationship to the spouses and 
the marriage under the principles stated in s[ection] 6. 
(2) A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the 
state where the marriage was contracted will everywhere be 
recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public policy of 
another state which had the most significant relationship to 
the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage. 18 
In short, a court must determine: 1) which state has the most signifi-
cant relationship with respect to the same-sex marriage issue, and 2) 
whether recognizing the marriage would violate a strong public policy of 
that state. The RESTATEMENT emphasizes the significance of the individual 
state's public policy in its declaration that: 
Marriage is a matter of intense public concern, and all states 
have rules stating how marriages may be contracted and pro-
hibiting certain marriages. The extent of the interest of a state 
in having its rule applied should be determined in the light of 
the purpose sought to be achieved by the rule and of the issue 
involved and by the relation of the marriage and the parties to 
the state. 19 Prior to determining whether recognition of a 
same-sex marriage violates a particular state's strong public 
policy, the RESTATEMENT requires that the court first consult 
state statutes for a law invalidating the out-of-state marriage 
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1988) (emphasis added). When 
deciding which state has the most significant relationship, a court employing the RESTATEMENT 
approach must evaluate the following section 6 factors: 
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, 
(b) the relevant policies of the forum, 
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relevant interests of those states in the 
determination of the particular issue, 
(d) the protection of justified expectations, 
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, 
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and 
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. 
ld. § 6. 
19. ld. § 283 cmt. b. 
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of local domiciliaries.20 The court shall review the state's case 
law to see if it requires invalidation, assuming there is no stat-
ute on point.21 Presuming both case and statutory law fail to 
answer the issue, the court must use its discretion in ascer-
taining whether any violation or unsatisfied requirement con-
stitutes a sufficiently strong public policy to warrant invalida-
tion.22 
B. New York: Conflict-of-Laws Principles and the Public Policy 
Exception 
1. Conflict-of-Laws 
Generally, when faced with the question of which ~~ate's law to apply 
in a particular case, a court must follow its conflict-of-laws principles.23 
These rules may differ depending on the subject of the dispute: for exam-
ple, whether the case involves a tort or a contract. An in depth look into 
the extensive field of conflict-of-laws exceeds the scope of this Comment. 
The relevant inquiry here is the exception to New York's conflict-of-laws 
rule. 
2. Public Policy Exception 
In accord with the RESTATEMENT, even if a New York court 
determines that a foreign state's law applies, the forum court may, based 
on public policy, nevertheless apply New York's law. In Schultz v. Boy 
Scouts of America, Inc. the Court of Appeals of New York stated: "[t]he 
public policy doctrine is an exception to implementing an otherwise 
applicable choice of law in which the forum refuses to apply a portion of 
foreign law because it is contrary or repugnant to its State's own public 
policy."24 The court added that the public policy doctrine is considered 
"only after the court has determined that the applicable substantive law 
20. /d. § 283 cmt. k. 
21. /d. 
22. /d. (citations omitted). The RESTATEMENT notes that, "[t]o date a marriage has only been 
invalidated when it violated a strong public policy of a state where at least one of the spouses was 
domiciled at the time of the marriage and where both made their home immediately thereafter." /d. 
The possibility of legal same-sex marriage in Hawaii opens up the likelihood of invalidation by 
another state's courts even though both spouses were domiciled in Hawaii. 
23. See generally Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (March 
1990); Terry S. Kogan, Toward a Jurisprudence of Choice of Law: the Priority of Fairness over 
Comity, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 651, (Oct. 1987); Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 
71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 547, (April-May 1996); Reese, Choice of Law: Rules of Approach, 57 CORNELL 
L. REV 315 (1972); Leflar, Choice Influencing Considerations and Conflicts of Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 267 (1966). 
24. 480 N.E.2d 679, 687 (N.Y. 1985). See also Monrad G. Paulsen & Michael I. Sovern, 
"Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 969 (1956). 
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under relevant choice-of-law principles is not the forum's law."25 
Assuming the court determines that a foreign state's law appertains, the 
court must enforce the foreign law "unless some sound reason of public 
policy makes it unwise for [the court] to lend [its] aid."26 
The party seeking to invoke the public policy exception has the burden 
of proving that the foreign law is contrary to New York public policyY 
The court noted: "public policy is not measured merely by individual 
notions of expediency and fairness or by showing that the foreign law is 
unreasonable or unwise."28 Rather, public policy is found in the state's: 1) 
statutes, 2) judicial decisions, 3) constitution; furthermore, the proponent 
of the exception must establish that enforcing the foreign law "would 
violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception 
of good morals, [or] some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal" 
expressed in them. 29 
IV. DETERMINING WHETHER RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
WOULD VIOLATE THE PUBLIC POLICY OF NEW YORK 
A. Statutory Guidance 
New York's statutes do not authorize in-state same-sex marriage, nor 
same-sex marriages performed in other states.30 Efforts to secure such 
measures have been pursued. In 1994 and again in 1995, the Assembly 
unsuccessfully attempted to pass legislation requiring New York to 
recognize validly performed non-domestic same-sex marriages.31 The 
rejection of the aforementioned legislation connotes an anti-same-sex 
marriage community in New York. 
The Storrs court, in dictum, suggested that the potential for a new 
consensus exists which state legislatures may see fit to recognize. It 
warned, however, that "[i]n the absence of such legislation, ... 'We ... 
decline the plaintiff's invitation to identify a new fundamental right, in the 
25. Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 687. 
26. /d. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
27. Id. at 688. 
28. !d. (citation omitted). 
29. !d. (citations omitted). In addition, the proponent must establish that there are enough 
contacts between the parties, the occurrence, and the New York forum to implicate New York's 
public policy and thus preclude enforcement of the foreign law. /d. 
The United States Supreme Court has reaffirmed that "the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not 
require a State to apply another State's law in violation of its own legitimate public policy." Nevada 
V. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 422 (1979). 
30. See Storrs v. Holcomb, 645 N.Y.S.2d 286, 287 (App. Div.1996); In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 
397, 407 (N.Y 1995). 
31. See Assembly Bill A-648 (N.Y. 1995); see Assembly Bill A-10508 (N.Y. 1994). 
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absence of a clear direction from the Court whose precedents we are bound 
to follow.' "32 
B. Case Law Guidance 
1. Storrs v. Holcomb 
While Storrs directly addressed the intra-state issue of whether New 
York authorizes same-sex partners, who are residents of the state, to obtain 
a marriage license, it also indirectly addressed the inter-state issue of 
whether New York will recognize same-sex marriages validly performed 
in foreign states. 
Storrs provides a judicial view of New York's public policy. The court 
based its holding that New York "does not recognize [inter-state] or 
authorize [intra-state] same sex marriage and that the City Clerk correctly 
refused to issue the license" on notions of public policy, due process and 
equal protection.33 Regarding public policy, the court conceded that the 
state has no legitimate purpose in preventing same-sex partners from 
exchanging personal commitments. 34 Responding to that concession, the 
court then gave some notion of New York's public policy on same-sex 
marriage by stating: 
Nevertheless, it would be a very long inferential leap, from 
this narrow premise, to the conclusion that a denial of a 
marriage license to a same-sex couple destroys a fundamental 
right so implicit in our understanding of ordered liberty that 
neither justice nor liberty would exist if it were sacrificed.35 
This language suggests that New York courts are unprepared to condone 
same-sex marriage.36 The court then solidified its position by responding to 
the overall notion of same-sex marriage in this manner: "The long 
32. Storrs, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 287-288 (citation omitted). 
33. /d. (emphasis added). 
34. /d. at 287. 
35. /d. 
36. Borrowing a Second Circuit Court of Appeals phrase, the court in Storrs "decline[d] the 
plaintiffs' invitation to identify a new fundamental right." Storrs v. Holcomb, 645 N.Y.S.2d 286, 287 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996). 
The city of Ithaca, however, supports the notion of same-sex marriage. In reaction to the Storrs 
litigation, six months prior to the trial court decision, the Mayor of Ithaca issued a statement 
expressing his and the city council's support of legalizing gay and lesbian marriage. Storrs v. 
Holcomb, 666 N.Y.S.2d 835, 836 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). The Mayor, nevertheless, declared that 
the City could not issue petitioners a marriage license at that time because of a State Department 
of Health directive. /d. 
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tradition of marriage, understood as the union of male and female, testifies 
to a contrary political, cultural, religious, and legal consensus.'m 
The Storrs court's broad declaration of New Y ark's consensus against 
same-sex marriage is specifically supported by other cases. There are six 
cases from 1971 to 1996, including Storrs, dealing with or mentioning the 
same-sex marriage issue. Each of those cases is either not on point to the 
instant issue38 or supports a policy of prohibiting same-sex marriages. 39 
The remainder of part IV will discuss those cases supporting a prohibition 
on same-sex marriage. 
2. Anonymous v. Anonymous 
Anonymous40 is the first New Y ark state lawsuit which considered 
same-sex marriage. The court declared that the so-called marriage 
ceremony between plaintiff, a male, and defendant, also a male (who 
posed as a female and who also underwent a sex-change operation), did 
not in fact or in law create a marriage contract, and that the parties are not, 
and never were, 'husband and wife' or parties to a valid marriage. 41 The 
court's rationale for its holding is straightforward. It stated: 
The law makes no provision for a 'marriage' between persons 
of the same-sex. Marriage is and always has been a contract 
between a man and a woman.42 Marriage may be defined as 
37. Storrs, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 287. 
38. See Koppehnan v. O'Keeffe, 535 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1988) (holding that because heterosexual 
life partners of a rent controlled apartment is not entitled to continue in possession, it is not a denial 
of equal protection to deny that right to a "gay life partner;" and that "gay life partner" would not 
be deemed either the functional equivalent of a surviving spouse or a de facto family member); 
Braschi v. Stahl Assoc. Co., 1987 WL 343445, at *I (N.Y.App. Div. Mar. 27, 1987) (granting a 
preliminary injunction restraining landlord from taking further action to terminate his tenancy until 
it could be determined whether tenant, as surviving gay life partner of deceased tenant of record, was 
entitled to maintain occupancy of apartment as family member (not as surviving spouse) of 
deceased); Yorkshire Towers Co. v. Baker, 510 N.Y.S.2d 976 (1986) (ordering that individuals of 
same sex, in longstanding quasi-marital relationship were de facto "immediate family members," 
rather than "roommates," for purposes of rent-stabilized lease renewal following death of one of 
them), order rev'd by Yorkshire Towers Co. v. Harpster, 538 N.Y.S.2d 703 (1988). 
39. See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1971); Frances B v. Mark B. 355 
N.Y.S.2d 712 (1974); In re Estate of Cooper, 564 N.Y.S.2d 684 (Surrogate's Ct. 1990), affd In re 
Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (1993), appeal dismissed In re Cooper, 624 N.E.2d 696 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1993). 
40. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499. 
41. !d. at 501. 
42. Some literature attempts to dispute the notion that same-sex marriages have never existed. 
See JOHN BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS IN PRE-MODERN EUROPE, 53-107, 218-61 (1995); William 
N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419, 1435-84 (1993). But see 
Phillip L. Reynolds, Same-Sex Unions: What Boswell Didn't Find, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Jan. 18, 
1995, at 49, 54. "Registered Partnership," a legal relationship between same sex partners similar, but 
not equal to marriage, exists currently in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. See Lawrence Ingrassia, 
Danes Don't Debate Same-Sex Marriages, They Celebrate Them, WALL ST. J., June 8, 1994, at AI, 
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the status or relation of a man and a woman who have been 
legally united as husband and wife. It may be more 
particularly defined as the voluntary union for life of one man 
and one woman as husband and wife.43 
As further explanation of its policy opposing same-sex marriage, the 
court followed an earlier precedent that stated: "[t]he mere fact that the law 
provides that physical incapacity for sexual relationship shall be ground 
for annulling a marriage is of itself sufficient indication of the public 
policy that such relationship shall exist with the result and for the purpose 
of begetting offspring."44 Since the era in which Anonymous was decided 
this argument has been deemed 'historical' by legal scholarship,45 but has 
persevered in judicial opinions.46 
3. Frances B. v. Mark B. 
In Frances B.,41 a wife brought an annulment action on the ground that 
her "husband" was female, a transsexual. In making its ruling on related 
motions, the court explained the following standard in New York: 
A8. 
Marriage is defined as 'the civil status, condition or relation of 
one man and one woman united in law for life, for the 
discharge to each other and the community of the duties 
legally incumbent upon those whose association is founded on 
the distinction of sex' .... Marriage was a custom long before 
the state issued licenses for that purpose. For a time marriage 
records were kept by the church. Some states even now 
recognize common law marriage which has neither the benefit 
of license nor clergy. In all cases, however, marriage has 
always been considered as the union of a man and a woman 
and we have been presented with no authority to the contrary. 
Neither by statutory nor decisional law has this state defined 
male and female. New York neither specifically prohibits 
marriage between persons of the same sex nor authorizes 
issuance of marriage license to such persons. However, 
marriage is and always has been a contract between a man 
and a woman.48 
43. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 500 (citation omitted). 
44. /d. (citing Mirizio v. Mirizio, ISO N.E. 605, 607 (N.Y. 1926)). 
45. See Note, In Sickness and in Health, in Hawaii and Where Else?: Conflict of and 
Recognition of Same-Sex-Marriages, 109 HARV. L. REV. 2038, 2046-47 (1996). 
46. See Baker v. Nelson 191 N.W.2d 185, 186-187 (Minn. 1971). 
47. Frances B. v. Mark B., 355 NY.S.2d 712 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974). 
48. /d. at 716 (citations omitted). 
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As with Anonymous, this case was adjudicated in the 1970s, and 
should only be given appropriate weight to the issue of present public 
policy in light of more recent cases. Nevertheless, it is one of only a few 
New York state court cases on same-sex marriage from which to assess 
New York's public policy. 
4. In re Estate of Cooper 
In re Estate of Cooper presents the issue of whether the survivor of a 
homosexual relationship, alleged to be a "spousal relationship," is entitled 
to a right of election against the decedent's will.49 The petitioner's own 
words may best explain the background of the case: "Except for the fact 
that we were of the same sex, our lives were identical to that of a husband 
and wife. We kept a common home; we shared expenses; our friends 
recognized us as spouses; we had a physical relationship."50 The survivor 
alleged that the only reason he and his partner were not legally married 
was because marriage license clerks in New York do not issue licenses to 
persons of the same sex. 51 
On appeal the petitioner further stated: 
I ask this Court simply to declare that if I can establish that 
Mr. Cooper and I, at the time of his death, were living in a 
spousal relationship, I am entitled to spousal rights, and the 
State-imposed unconstitutional impediment of making it 
impossible for two people of the same sex to obtain a marriage 
license does not alter this. 52 
The court refused the petitioner's invitation, holding that the survivor was 
not a "surviving spouse"53 within the meaning of the applicable New York 
statute. 54 
49. 564 N.Y.S.2d 684, 685 (Surrogate's Ct. 1990), aff'd, In re Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 
(App. Div. 1993). In re Cooper is addressed next. 
50. In re Estate of Cooper, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 685. 
51. /d. 
52. In re Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 797. 
53. In re Estate of Cooper, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 688. The court also noted: "[p]ersons of the 
same sex have no constitutional rights to enter into a marriage with each other. Neither due process 
nor equal protection of law provisions are violated by prohibiting such marriages." /d. at 685. It later 
stated: 
The court concludes that marriage between homosexuals cannot be legalized under the Laws 
of the State of New York and that such purported marriages do not give rise to any rights 
either pursuant to or similar to those granted by EPTL 5-1.1 (providing that the surviving 
spouse may elect against the will). No constitutional rights have been abrogated or violated 
in so holding. /d. at 688. 
54. N.Y. Estates, Powers and Trusts Law §5-1.1 (McKinney's 1997). 
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In its analysis, the court revealed this recent viewpoint in New York: 
"[t]raditionally and currently, the terms "marriage" and "spouse" 
necessarily and exclusively involve a contract between persons of different 
sexes."55 While the survivor here did not argue for recognition of marriage, 
he requested the court to deem him a "spouse" in the context of having 
spousal rights in his partner's estate. The court rejected this contention on 
the basis of public policy: "[t]o do so would be impermissible judicial 
legislating and contrary to the public policy expressed by our 
Legislature .... The Legislature has chosen to restrict the right to marry to 
people of the opposite sex."56 
5. In re Cooper 
The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the holding of the 
foregoing case, rejecting the petitioner's contention that the traditional 
definition of the term "surviving spouse" must be revised, and replaced 
with a broader definition which would include the petitioner. 57 The appeals 
court concluded, as did the lower tribunal, that the term "surviving 
spouse" cannot be interpreted to include homosexual life partners.58 
A large part of the court's analysis was a review of Baker v. Nelson, a 
Minnesota Supreme Court case.59 The Baker court rejected the argument 
that the absence of an express statutory prohibition against same-sex 
marriages evidences a legislative intent to authorize them.60 Instead, the 
Baker court insisted that the legislature's intent was to the contrary: "[The 
statute] which governs 'marriage,' employs that term as one of common 
usage, meaning the state of union between persons of the opposite sex."61 
C. Constitutional Guidance 
1. Storrs v. Holcomb 
Because the question of same-sex marriage has not reached the New 
York Court of Appeals, the Storrs court turned to In re Cooper (Appellate 
Division, Second Department) for guidance as to whether a ban on same-
sex marriages is unconstitutional. Based on In re Cooper, the Storrs court 
concluded that only a rational relation needed to be shown between a 
55. In re Estate of Cooper, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 686 (emphasis added). 
56. /d. (emphasis added). 
57. In re Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 799. 
58. /d. The appeals court added that it held in In re Alison D. v. Virginia, 552 N.Y.S.2d 321, 
aff'd, 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1990), that a lesbian partner was not a "parent" under Domestic 
Relations Law § 70(a). 
59. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971). 
60. !d. at 185-86. 
61. !d. 
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similar classification and a legitimate state purpose in deciding whether 
banning same-sex marriage violates the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.62 The Storrs court conceded that the precise point 
at issue in In re Cooper was not on same-sex marriage per se, but rather 
whether the term "surviving spouse," as used in the statute, extends to the 
survivor of a homosexual life partnership.63 Nevertheless, the Storrs court 
stated that proscribing same-sex marriage does not inhibit equal protection: 
"the ratio decidendi forged by the [In re Cooper] court includes holdings 
that marriage, in this state, is limited to opposite sex couples and that the 
gender classification serves a valid public purpose."64 
2. In re Estate of Cooper 
As outlined in more detail above,65 the survivor of a homosexual 
relationship argued that the denial of a right to a marriage license resulting 
in the survivor's inability to marry his partner in New York State involves 
state action.66 The court summarized his argument: 
[A]ccording to the surviving partner, under the doctrine of 
Under 21 v. City of New York, this court would be 
compounding his deprivation of equal protection of law 
guaranteed by Section 1 of the 141h Amendment of the United 
States Constitution were it to rule that because he could not 
obtain a marriage license, he could not be recognized as a 
spouse for the purpose of claiming spousal rights.67 
The court's response and holding were that same sex partners do not have 
a constitutional right to enter into marriage with each other, and that, 
"[n]either due process nor equal protection of law provisions are violated 
by prohibiting such marriages."68 
The court based its holding partly on the Minnesota Supreme Court 
decision in Baker in which the petitioners contended that: 
[T]he prohibition [to marry] denied them a fundamental right 
guaranteed by the Ninth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and made applicable to the states by the 
62. Constitutional analysis in New York and in the United States requires one of three 
possible standards in reviewing an equal protection question: rational relation (sometimes termed 
rational basis review), heightened scrutiny, or strict scrutiny. See In re Cooper, 564 N.Y.S.2d 684, 
686 (Surrogate's Ct. 1990). See also Moe v. Dinkins, 669 F.2d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 1982). See supra 
note 53 at 685, 688. 
63. Storrs v. Holcomb, 645 N.Y.S.2d 286, 287 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996). 
64. /d. (emphasis added). 
65. See supra Part IV, Section B, Part 4. 
66. In re Estate of Cooper, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 685. 
67. /d. (citations omitted). 
68. /d. 
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Fourteenth Amendment, thereby depriving them of liberty and 
property without due process, and denying them the equal 
protection of laws, both guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. They asserted that the right to marry without 
regard to the sex of the parties is a fundamental right to all 
persons and that to restrict marriage to couples of the opposite 
sex is irrational and invidiously discriminatory. 69 
The In re Estate of Cooper court, in justifying its denial of the equal 
protection claim, quoted the Baker court: "This historic institution 
manifestly is more deeply founded than the asserted contemporary concept 
of marriage and societal interest for which petitioners contend. The due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not a charter for 
restructuring it by judiciallegislation."70 Speaking of the Baker case the In 
re Estate of Cooper court further noted that: 
[T]he Minnesota statute, as construed, prohibiting marriage 
between persons of the same sex, was not irrational nor 
invidious and did not offend the First, Eighth, Ninth, or 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. 
The appeal from the Minnesota Supreme Court to the United 
States Supreme Court was dismissed for want of a substantial 
federal question. Such a dismissal is a holding that the 
constitutional challenge was considered and rejected.71 
3. In re Cooper 
On appeal, the petlttoner repeated his argument that a narrow 
definition of the term "surviving spouse" is unconstitutional as it violates 
the equal protection clause of the State Constitution.72 The petitioner 
specifically argued that this unconstitutional definition directly derives 
from, and compounds, the State's unconstitutional conduct in interpreting 
the relevant provisions of the Domestic Relations Law as prohibiting 
members of the same sex from obtaining marriage licenses.73 The court 
then countered the petitioner's argument, explaining that three standards 
may be applied in reviewing equal protection challenges: strict scrutiny, 
heightened scrutiny, and rational basis review.74 The appeals court 
condoned the lower court's equal protection analysis which applied the 
69. /d. 
70. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971). 
71. In re Estate of Cooper, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 686 (quoting Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186). 
72. In re Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 799. 
73. /d. 
74. /d. (citing City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440-441 
(1985)). 
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rational basis standard. Rational basis review mandates that the legislation 
(or government action) "is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if 
the classification drawn is rationally related to a legitimate state interest,"75 
and not the more stringent standards of heightened scrutiny or strict 
scrutiny.76 
The appeals court relied on Baker in deciding that rational basis and 
not a higher standard of scrutiny should apply. Baker rejected the 
argument that a prohibition on same-sex marriages denied petitioners 
equal protection of the laws, holding as follows: 
These constitutional challenges have in common the 
assertion that the right to marry without regard to the sex of 
the parties is a fundamental right of all persons and that 
restricting marriage to only couples of the opposite sex is 
irrational and invidiously discriminatory. We are not 
independently persuaded by these contentions and do not find 
support for them in any decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court .... 
. . . The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, like the due process clause, is not offended by the state's 
classification of persons authorized to marry. There is no 
irrational or invidious discrimination. 77 
E. New York's Concept of Justice, Good Morals, and Tradition 
To refuse application of foreign law, New York requires that enforcing 
the foreign law "would violate some fundamental principle of justice, 
some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of 
the common weal.'m 
1. Principles of Justice 
The language within Storrs reveals New York's concept of justice in 
the context of marriage. After the court acknowledged that the state has no 
legitimate purpose in preventing same-sex partners from exchanging 
personal commitments,79 it stated: 
75. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. 
76. In re Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 799-800. 
77. /d. at 800 (quoting Baker v. Norton, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186-87 (Minn. 1971)). 
78. Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 688 (N.Y. 1985). 
79. Storrs v. Holcomb, 645 N.Y.S.2d 286, 287 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996). 
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[N)evertheless, it would be a very long inferential leap, from 
this narrow premise, to the conclusion that a denial of a 
marriage license to a same sex couple destroys a fundamental 
right so implicit in our understanding of ordered liberty that 
neither justice nor liberty would exist if it were sacrificed.80 
Accordingly, within New York's boundaries, it is the opinion of the 
judiciary that same-sex marriage is not a right under its concept of justice 
and liberty. 
Constitutional analysis also indicates that a policy denying the right to 
same-sex marriage does not violate principles of justice. The court stated 
in In re Cooper that denying marriage to same-sex couples is neither 
"irrational" nor "individiously discriminatory." Quoting Baker the court 
noted: 
These constitutional challenges have in common the assertion 
that the right to marry without regard to the sex of the parties 
is a fundamental right of all persons and that restricting 
marriage to only couples of the opposite sex is irrational and 
invidiously discriminatory. We are not independently 
persuaded by these contentions and do not find support for 
them in any decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court .... 
. . . The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, like the due process clause, is not offended by the state's 
classification of persons authorized to marry. There is no 
irrational or invidious discrimination.81 
Moreover, despite two attempts, the Legislature has not yet passed a law 
requiring New York to recognize same-sex marriages validly celebrated in 
a foreign state. 82 
2. Prevalent Conception of Good Morals 
Ideally, a state legislature, as the voice of the people, reflects and 
protects the citizens' concept of morality. New York's law-making body 
has spoken twice on the same-sex marriage issue. As mentioned earlier, in 
80. Jd. 
81. In re Cooper, 592 N.Y.S2d at 800 (quoting Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186-87 
(Minn. 1971)). 
82. See supra text accompanying note 31. 
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1994 and 1995 attempts to pass law permitting same-sex marriages 
failed. 83 
Making an analogy between same-sex marriage and common law 
marriage may also help to draw out New York's notion of good morals. 
Unlike some states, New York has long refused to authorize common law 
marriages. 84 Although New York does not itself authorize common law 
marriages, such a union might be recognized as valid in New York if it 
was validly contracted in a sister state. 85 The law to be applied in 
determining the validity of such an out-of-state marriage is the law of the 
state in which the marriage purportedly occurred. 86 
Two opposing arguments may arise from comparing common law 
marriage (marriage not solemnized in the ordinary way, i.e. non-
ceremonial, but created by an agreement to marry, followed by 
cohabitation) to same-sex marriage. Same-sex marriage proponents might 
contend that the foregoing analysis should apply to couples of the same 
sex married in a foreign state. Same-sex marriage opponents contend, 
however, that despite the fact that New York may recognize valid out of 
state common law marriage, it looks down upon and even prohibits 
common law marriage within its own borders; if the state has a dim view 
of common law marriage, then New York has the prerogative to take a dim 
view of same-sex marriage. 
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized that "reasonable regulations" may 
be applied by the states to opposite-sex marriages. Indeed, such 
prohibitions as health, age, and consanguinity are common.87 Similarly, the 
New York Court of Appeals has acknowledged "the broad authority of the 
Legislature to set standards and procedures to control such a basic 
institution as marriage" and, thus, to refuse recognition to common law 
marriages between opposite-sex couples. 88 The Storrs court also clarified 
that marriage is inherently limited: "[c]learly, rights to the perquisites of 
the marital estate are not absolute."89 
83. ld. 
84. Ledwith v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 660 N.Y.S.2d 402. 407 (App. Div. 1997); Tomese 
v. Tomese, 649 N.Y.S.2d 177, 178 (App. Div. 1996); In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 407 (N.Y. 
1995). 
85. See supra note 84. See also Mon v. Duncan Petroleum Trans., 414 N.E.2d 657 (N.Y. 
1980); In re Estate of Watts, 294 N.E.2d 195 (N.Y. 1973). 
86. See supra note 84. See also Mott, 414 N.E.2d 657; In re Estate of Gates, 596 N.Y.S.2d 
194 (1993), dismissed in part, denied in part 619 N.E.2d 646 (1993). 
87. Storrs v. Holcomb, 645 N.Y.S.2d 286, 287 (1996) (citing Zablocki v. Rehail, 434 U.S. 
374 (1978)). 
88. !d. (citation omitted). 
89. ld. 
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3. Deep-Rooted Tradition 
The recent Storrs court countered the proposal of same-sex marriage 
by stating: "[t]he long tradition of marriage, understood as the union of 
male and female, testifies to a contrary political, cultural, religious and 
legal consensus."90 
Likewise, the court in Anonymous stated two decades ago: 
[M] arriage is and always has been a contract between a man 
and a woman. Marriage may be defined as the status or 
relation of a man and a woman who have been legally united 
as husband and wife. It may be more particularly defined as 
the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman as 
husband and wife.91 
And in In re Estate of Cooper, a case decided less than eight years 
ago, the court stated: "[t]raditionally and currently, the terms "marriage" 
and "spouse" necessarily and exclusively involve a contract between 
persons of different sexes."92 
V. CONCLUSION 
The issue of whether New York will recognize a same-sex marriage 
validly performed in another state must be decided on New Y ark's 
conflict-of-laws and choice-of-law principles. Assuming New York 
implements the law of a foreign state which authorizes same-sex marriage, 
and presuming the marriage is validly performed, New York courts will 
likely refuse to recognize the marriage based on the conflicts-of-law public 
policy exception. New York's public policy is found within the state's 
statutes, case law, constitution, and concept of justice, good morals, and 
tradition. The foregoing analysis of these factors reveals that New York's 
policy unequivocally advocates opposite-sex marriage and robustly 
opposes same-sex marriage. 
Todd C. Hilbig 
90. Storrs, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 287. 
91. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 500 (citation omitted). 
92. In re Estate of Cooper, 564 N.Y.S.2d 684, 686 (1990) (emphasis added). 
